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There is a belief that addressing terrorism is the federal government’s 
responsibility. The federal government, as large as it is, cannot be everywhere.  Law 
enforcement can and should supplement where the federal government is lacking. The 
purpose of this research paper is determining whether local law enforcement is prepared 
to deal with terrorism in this nascent form.  Addressing this matter and preparing 
accordingly has become a crucial component of law enforcement training due to         
the reality that at any given moment a catastrophic event can and will occur. Through 
research and analysis of previous terrorist events that have occurred in the United 
States, it is apparent that there exists a significant disconnection between federal and 
local law enforcement agencies to provide safety and security.  It is recommended that 
local law enforcement agencies get back to the basic ‘grass roots’ of community policing 
by developing operational strategies, philosophical strategies, and resource deployment 
strategies to combat attacks of terrorism. 
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It is commonly wondered how physical beings such as government agents or 
police officers can combat a concept like terrorism. Terrorism, though conceptually 
intangible, manifests physically during terrorist attacks. Prior to this manifestation there 
are other physical forms, such as attack planners, weapons stockpiles, etc. that will be 
used to facilitate these attacks. Of concern in this research paper is whether local law 
enforcement is prepared to deal with terrorism in this nascent form. 
Terrorist attacks have the potential to affect hundreds to thousands of lives in a 
single event.  For example, according to Shariat, Mallonee, and Stephens-Stidham 
(1998), the Oklahoma City bombing affected 1,259 people and harmed or killed 851 
people. It is because of this potential that confronting terrorism is as important a topic 
as it currently is. 
It is the responsibility of law enforcement officers around the globe to protect 
lives, to protect property, and to maintain order.  These fundamental responsibilities 
have not changed. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
government changed the focus of federal law enforcement agencies, and the 
Department of Homeland Security, and its child agency Immigration and Custom 
Enforcement (ICE) were formed.  Although this augmented federal response, it did 
nothing to enhance local response. 
Associated Press reporter Matt Apuzzo stated about the NYPD Intelligence 
Division, “the lesson of 9/11 to the NYPD was, “We can’t sit back and just let the federal 
government tell us how to keep us safe or what intelligence we need to know or who 





responsibility for this ourselves, and we’re going to go to wherever we need to go to get 
this information” (Green, 2011, para. 3). Local law enforcement must respond to 
attacks as they come and after they are executed, while it currently remains the role of 
federal agencies to address the planning stages of these attacks.  It is then the goal of 
this research to address why the deficiencies that local law enforcement has, vis-à-vis 
terrorist attacks, must be addressed. Local law enforcement should develop the ability 
to recognize and properly handle nascent/present terrorist threats. Law enforcement 
can and should supplement where the federal government is lacking. 
For purposes of this research paper, terrorism will be defined as the systematic 
use of violence attacking civilian targets, local/federal buildings, public gathering places 
and any other venue to send a message or achieve some goal. The use of violence 
may target a school, movie theater, marathon event or any physical structure, still the 
purpose and intent of the terrorist is to cause fear, harm, and, ultimately, serving a 
purpose. This research paper will explore and propose recommendations for the 
responses of varying acts of terrorism. 
POSITION 
 
As stated above, terrorism has the potential to affect lives at a large scale. Since 
the public is not confronted with terrorism daily, their perception of police protection is 
confined to small-scale threats such as personal property and personal injury at most a 
bar room brawl, family fight, or traffic related incident.  Mass casualty events are rare, 
and the public is normally surprised when they think of beat cops taking on Al-Qaeda. 
However, when a terrorist attacks, it affects every day citizens: it is not confined to 





local law enforcement as well as the federal government. This is why preventing these 
attacks should be the responsibility of both groups. 
In a report released by the House Committee on Homeland Security on the 
Boston Marathon bombings on April 2013, it pinpointed failures of state, local, and 
federal authorities to communicate and share information that could have prevented this 
attack. The report further stated that there was simply a failure to “connect the dots”, an 
all-purpose disclaimer used to avoid serious accounting for previous unexplained 
failures of government agencies to prevent terror attacks, from the September 11, 2001 
attacks on New York and Washington, DC, to the attempted 2009 Christmas Day 
bombing over Detroit Metro airport (Barrickman, 2014, para. 22). 
The protection of the lives that fall under local or federal law enforcement 
jurisdiction is of the highest priority. Whether dealing with a small town or a large city, 
law enforcement must understand their responsibility to ensure the appropriate tools are 
utilized to prevent an attack and to quickly respond if one should occur. Though terrorist 
attacks are usually intended to cause mass casualties in large cities, as a message to 
be sent, recent school shootings, such as the Sandy Hook School and the Boston 
Marathon bombings demonstrate that sometimes there is no message to be sent and 
attacks can happen anywhere.  Both acts required an effective response from law 
enforcement that is prepared to handle such a catastrophic event. This has become a 
crucial component of law enforcement training due to the reality that at any given 
moment another school shooting or an act of terrorism can and will occur.  This is not to 






could have been prevented had certain leads been explored. These leads however are 
likely hard to find and require special investigative teams. 
Berry (2012) expressed, “Government at all levels is recognizing the need for 
change in law enforcement ability to respond and adapt to changes as new threats 
emerge” (p.13).  Local law enforcement traditionally is designated in a first responder 
role. This means, for terrorist attacks, their first engagement is during an attack or most 
likely after casualties have occurred. This highlights how reactive local law enforcement 
has become and perhaps shows that engagement at earlier point of the whole timeline 
of the attack, including planning, may have saved lives.  According to J.D. Lightfoot, an 
instructor for a Midwestern police department, “During an active shooter incident, you 
are dealing with a very brutal equation: Time taken by first responders equals 
casualties” (Pirro, 2013, p. 3). 
Proactivity, when dealing with terrorism, means more than just ‘being ready to 
handle a crisis at any given moment.’ This sort of readiness is a hallmark of any good 
police department. Terrorist attacks call for a proactivity that has been conventionally 
reserved for federal agencies. The aim of this research would be to augment the local 
police agencies with a new section, devoted solely to counter terrorism. This squad’s 
main focus would be intelligence gathering, leaving crisis response (the reactive 
element of counter-terrorism) to already trained SWAT teams. 
The federal government, admittedly in all aspects (training, resources, personnel, 
etc.), is leagues ahead of any local team that can be formed. The agencies that deal 
with counter-terrorism at the federal level have been growing steadily since the 9/11 





be on the leading edge of intelligence gathering, interception of plans, and all manner of 
stopping attacks before they occur.  It is then unfortunate that this data historically has 
not been shared with localities where these attacks may occur. 
Local authorities are made aware of the attacks sometimes only after they have 
occurred.  Federal surveillance sometimes skips over home-grown terrorists whose 
plans are not broadcast but still betray their intent through less monitored channels like 
behavioral changes at school, large purchases of explosive intermediaries, or other 
non-descript “flags”.  It is precisely these gaps that local enforcement can, and should, 
fill in (“National Commission,” 2004). 
This counter-terrorism unit also can be proactive in other ways.  Identification of 
potentially unsecured targets, community awareness programs, informant programs, 
and many other means can be used to protect all fronts. High profile targets 
(energy/chemical plants, military buildings) within cities must be identified and, whether 
unsecured or not, should be fortified against easy access or simple critical attack. 
Community outreach can augment the senses of the counter-terrorist squads by 
enlisting the aid of citizens and teaching them what to look for. Police departments will 
not be effective at counter-terrorism unless an earnest effort is made. 
The concepts outlined above should be acted upon to fulfill both the duty of local 
law enforcement agencies to protect the lives under their charge and for these agencies 
to take a more active role in dealing with a threat that faces us all. The adage goes “an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” At the International Organizations 
Security Council meeting held in Africa on January 15, 2013, Ron Prosor, the Israeli 





challenge we face is growing as a result of an increasingly linked network of smuggling 
rings, transnational criminals, and terrorists” (Prosor, 2013, para. 97). Prevention in the 
case of terrorism requires a unified front of all agencies working together. 
When normal crimes are committed, police step in and investigate the crime from 
what is known at the end and work backward, following the evidence to a suspect or 
group of suspects. Terrorism needs to be confronted pre-emptively from potential 
suspects to crimes on the verge of commission. According to Riley, Trevor, Wilson, 
and Davis (2005) “counter-terrorism investigation especially aimed at prevention, must 
look at a number of paths – assembling enough information about each to know when 
patterns are changing or something suspicious is afoot” (p. xv).  For these paths to be 
followed, a far reach is required, along with more ‘boots on the ground’. These ‘boots’, 
should be both federal and local to create the widest network possible. 
COUNTER POSITION 
 
Adoption of a unified front of federal, state, and local law enforcement against 
terrorism is bound to have detractors.  Some believe that it should be the sole purview 
of the federal government. Others think that local departments do not have or should 
not spend the resources on extra-ordinary squads and units. Still others would protest 
that this already exists in the form of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. 
This section will detail those points of view and attempt to rebut them. 
 
Terrorism, generally, is a message to a state. Whether in the Middle East, 
Europe, Russia, or in the United States, the message is intended to be sent to the 
leaders. Examples include the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Moscow Theatre crisis, 





because of this, many see terrorism as not a criminal act, but a matter of national 
security.  In 2005, Terwilliger, Cooperstein, Gunnarson, Blumenthal and Parker, posited 
that: “The Constitution confers on the federal government an “independent substantive 
power” with respect to national security, and specifically with respect to the “persons or 
property of [an] enemy found, at the time, within the territory” of the United States” 
(Terwilliger, et al, 2005,  para. 10). 
The federal government is better trained, they are better equipped, and it is their 
duty to protect the nation from external threats. Theirs, at least superficially, looks to be 
the better claim concerning stopping acts of war from terrorists.  However, the acts of 
terror committed, while they sometimes are well organized and executed, are not 
committed by armies or States. These acts are still carried out by individuals, like 
normal crimes. They are not carried out on a field of battle, rather they are done in the 
heart of cities or industrial centers that fall under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement 
agencies. These attacks are not directed, by and large, at military targets.                   
To truly ‘terrorize’ and incite fear, the attacks are directed at the citizenry. While it would 
be easy to answer this counter-argument by using “protection of life” as an answer, 
there are lesser answers.  This paper deals with attacks within the homeland; these 
attacks are rarely planned elsewhere and then committed here.  Because these attacks 
must be planned here, and planning takes much time, the terrorists will likely encounter 
local law enforcement far before they alert the federal government of their presence and 
intent, barring of course their initial entry into the country if they are foreign.  Home- 
grown terrorists will be deeply ingrained in the local communities, where the federal 





explosive materials, transport, etc., will have to be acquired locally (within the United 
States). For these reasons, local law enforcement, when as deeply ingrained as the 
perpetrators, through community policing and other efforts, stand a much higher chance 
of intercepting and stopping attacks. With proper counter-terrorist training, or a counter- 
terrorist unit, the chances only get higher.  According to Riley, Trevor, Wilson and Davis 
(2005), “It is increasingly said that federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and US Secret Service can no longer work alone in protecting the 
United States from further attack.  Rather they must work in partnership with other 
public, and private agencies and most important with local police” (p. xv). 
In 2012, the federal government appropriated 716 billion dollars to national 
defense. The government also appropriated 60.5 billion to the Department of Homeland 
Security. While not all of this was spent solely for counter terrorism, this does not 
include money spent on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FBI, or any other 
agencies involved with counter terrorism. With such large amounts involved, some 
argue that funding counter terrorism at the local level would be cost-prohibitive. 
Realistically, terrorist threats are directed at high profile targets in large cities. 
 
Small cities and counties, rural locations, would likely not have to worry, e.g. would not 
have to spend much on simple training. Large cities would have to bear the brunt of the 
cost. Communication and cooperation would be extremely important. The costs 
incurred by the local departments would be much smaller and much more focused than 
those of the federal government as local departments have less ground to cover. 
Whether the agency is small, serving less than 50,000 residents, or a larger agency, 





resources available, and the ability to incorporate this training on a yearly basis. This is 
not to say the cost will not be significant, rather that it will not be prohibitive.  For 
example the costs associated to the response of the Sandy Hook School shooting were 
significant.  However, no response is not an option and agencies should be prepared 
financially. 
Finally, many people associate police counter operations with SWAT.  SWAT has 
military weaponry, and is trained in how to use it.  It is inevitable that some will say that 
SWAT already fulfills a counter-terrorist role. With their military style-training and 
experience dealing with hostage/standoff situations, it seems that they would be the 
perfect group, already in place, to deal with terrorist threats in their cities. 
SWAT, however, is suited toward a reactionary role.  SWAT, by its very nature, is 
there to counter threats that have already presented themselves.  For this counter- 
terrorism unit, their “aim would be to supplement SWAT response or immediately react 
and terminate a possible attack in the event that waiting for a SWAT response would 
result in a further loss of life” (Mannix, 2005, p. 10). These units could also augment 
and coordinate the response to an attack that would involve multiple attacks set to 
happen simultaneously. 
The law enforcement community together with the community must be creative, 
resourceful and strategic in the methods they design to prevent terrorist to take root in 
their neighborhoods. The idea of counter-terrorist units at a local police level might not 
garner much support initially.  However consider what the New York Police Department 
did after the attacks of 9/11. They hired David Cohen CIA, and Michael Sheehan 





department. The Transportation Safety Agency, DHS, and other agencies that evolved 
in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks have inured people to the idea that more 
government is the answer.  Some of the reactions of the government post 9/11 were 
mistakes; others brought tighter security to the United States. It is hard to measure the 
efficacy of these programs, as the metric of “no further terrorist attacks” could be 
because of sheer luck, or it could be that the programs enacted are working.  This lack 
of a measure for efficacy, as well as decline in public support for measures such as 
these should not prevent their adoption. 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
For the reasons stated and the research quoted, local law enforcement should 
develop a means of handling terrorist threats to their communities. Preferably, these 
threats should be dealt with before they become outright attacks with the potential for a 
mass casualty event. It is suggested that a full unit be created, a counter-terrorism 
department, separate from any other unit. For the police to perform their duty, that of 
protecting the citizens under their charge, threats should be assessed and prevented. 
While many threats have been accounted for, lethal and otherwise, terrorist attack is still 
something that local police respond to rather than investigate.  While the government 
has already initiated the creation of agencies to combat terrorism, there are gaps where 
the government cannot reach. Local law enforcement fills these gaps in other roles, and 
should in this role as well. 
The arguments shown against creating local counter-terrorism units are many, 
and this research has focused on three specific areas: Whether it is the role of local 





teams already fulfill this role. These arguments were rebutted. It is the role of local 
police to protect the lives under their jurisdiction, and terrorist attacks affect these 
citizens, so the connection is clear. The expense is likely overstated based on current 
funding numbers, inefficiencies, and other bloat. As well, the funding will be distributed 
across multiple localities.  SWAT teams are reactive, and the crux of this research is to 
promote pro-activity. 
It is then recommended that a counter terrorist unit within local departments be 
formed. Intelligence training from federal agencies would be necessary.  Civil liberties 
must be maintained, and this unit cannot overreach its boundaries. Police powers are 
granted to law enforcement by the constitution; however, the community has to be part 
of this equation because a core function is to serve as a public servant. Maintaining 
public trust is executed through community policing efforts.  It takes a community to 
prevent crime. As with other governmental agencies, caution must be exercised, and it 
is better to err on the side of the citizen, rather than the side of security. 
Some of these steps have already been taken.  NYPD has taken a Community 
Policing-Based approach to counter-terrorism.  In 2005, Skolnick reported on the 
NYPD’s efforts in implementing this sort of strategy.  Deputy Commissioner James Fyfe 
stated, “terrorists don't like to live in corners, they prefer the middle of the block, they 
keep windows covered, they have little furniture, they come and go, they pay in cash, 
they don't have checking accounts, [and] they don't have credit cards” (Skolnick, 2005, 
p. 55).  Fyfe explained different characteristics of terrorists, and further stated, “Any one 
of these is not a crime, but taken together, they might constitute a pattern suggesting 





officer can build relationships within a community, “that's valuable for enforcing the 
criminal law, and for preventing terror” (Skolnick, 2005, p. 56) With foundations already 
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